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amendment in order to provide law enforcement officials with even more
security at the expense of the citizen's right of privacy.66 Such a trend
"would preclude consideration of the reasonableness of any particular
search, and so would take away the protection that the [C]onstitution
07
is designed to provide.
TONY

M.

EDWARDS

CLASS ACTIONS SCUTTLED IN
LAKE CHAMPLAIN
Four owners of property fronting on Lake Champlain in Vermont
brought a diversity action against International Paper Company for permitting discharge from its pulp and paper-making plant to pollute the
lake, thereby causing damage to lake-front property. Each of the four
named plaintiffs alleged individual damages in excess of $10,000. The
action was brought as a class action under rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of approximately 200 property owners
and lessees, all of whom had suffered damages. It was not alleged that
each unnamed member of the class had suffered individual damages in
excess of $10,000, and the trial court was convinced "to a legal certainty"
that not every unnamed member of the class had suffered damages in that
amount. "[W]ith great reluctance," the United States District Court of
Vermont held1 that each class member must independently satisfy the requirement as to jurisdictional amount,2 thus forcing dismissal of the
action as to all members of the class not meeting this requirement. The
court further held that in this case the problem of "defining an appropriate class" over which the court had jurisdiction was "insuperable."'
66. This theory is buttressed by the recent Supreme Court decision of United States
v. Edwards, 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974) which held reasonable a search of an arrestee's clothing
ten hours after his arrest. Mr. Justice Stewart declared that the evidence so obtained
could be admissible "only by disregarding established Fourth Amendment principles firmly
embodied in many previous decisions of this Court." Id. at 1240 (dissent).
67. People v. Watlins, 19 Ill.
2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (1960).
1. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
2. "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971). Regarding the
problem of defining the class, the court said:
A determination before trial of the landowners actually encompassed within this
class would require the unnamed class members to appear and at least plead, and
perhaps prove facts substantiating an amount in controversy. This would eliminate any advantage of a class action over joinder; a class action would therefore not be properly mintainable because class treatment would not be "superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
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Therefore the court dismissed the action as to the entire unnamed class,
permitting only the four named plaintiffs to proceed on their own behalf.
This decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed: Each plaintiff in a rule 23(b) (3) class action must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement, and any named or
unnamed plaintiff who does not do so must be dismissed from the case.
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 94 S.Ct. 505 (1973).
Since its adoption from equity in 1938,1 the class action has been
heralded as a means of both eliminating the necessity of repetitious or
inconsistent litigation and of providing plaintiffs with a method of prosecuting claims which otherwise would be too small to warrant litigation.'
Prior to 1966, this latter function was largely defeated in diversity suits
by the application of jurisdictional amount requirements to each indi7
vidual plaintiff in "hybrid" and "spurious" class actions.
In 1966, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was revised,
and the "true," "hybrid" and "spurious" classifications were abolished.
Subsection (b) (3) of "new" rule 23 authorized a class action when
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy
Some commentators' and courts 0 saw this change as an opportunity, if
versy," as required by Rule 23(b) (3). Nor could further definition of the class
be postponed until after trial on the liability issue.
Id. at 433. The court concluded: "Thus the requirement that each class member meet the
jurisdictional amount clearly undermines the usefulness of Rule 23(b)(3) class suits." Id.
4. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See C. WIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 306 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter

cited as C. WRIGHT], and Kaplan, Continuing Work oj the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments oj the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. Rav. 356, 376 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Kaplan], for discussion on the background of rule 23.
6. C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 306.
7. The rule distinguished three types of class actions: "true," in which the "character
of the right" asserted for or against the class must be "joint or common," "hybrid," in
which the right must be "'several' with the action directed to the adjudication of claims
affecting specific property," and "spurious," in which the right is "'several' with a common
relief sought." In cases involving "true" class actions, in which the right asserted was not
distinguishable among class members, courts required only that the total claim asserted
exceed the jurisdictional amount requirement. However, in cases involving "hybrid" or
"spurious" actions, "aggregation" of claims was not permitted. See Kaplan, supra note 5,
at 377.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
9. Professor Kaplan, the reporter for the committee which drafted the 1966 rule, commented:
New Rule 23 alters the pattern of class actions; subdivision (b)(3), in particular,
is a new category deliberately created. Like other innovations from time to time
introduced into the Civil Rules, those as to class actions change the total situation
on which the statutes and theories regarding subject matter jurisdiction are brought
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not a signal, to reinterpret the jurisdictional requirements with respect
to class actions. However in 1969, the United States Supreme Court in
Snyder v. Harris" ruled that despite the revision of rule 23, plaintiffs
could not aggregate their claims to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
Following Snyder, one possibility remained: Perhaps, as in the cases
of ancillary jurisdiction" z and diversity requirements, 8 jurisdictional
amount requirements would only be applied to the named plaintiffs and
not to the other members of the class. Now, in Zahn, the Court has
eliminated this last hope, and in doing so, has struck a devastating if
not fatal blow to diversity class actions.
In affirming the dismissal of all unnamed plaintiffs, the Zahn Court
applied the "familiar rule" that
when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct demands in a
single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy
must be of the requisite amount [as specified in 28 U.S.C. 1332
(1970)] ... , and.., those amounts cannot be added together
to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 4
Citing Snyder, the Court reiterated its determination that the 1966 revision of rule 23 in no way modified the jurisdictional amount requirement. While acknowledging that Snyder was distinguishable in that there
was no single plaintiff who met the $10,000 requirement, the Court
asserted, nonetheless, that
"there is no doubt that the rationale of that
5
case controls this one."'
to bear.. . . [lt also presents a new complex in deciding questions of permissible
"aggregation" of amounts in controversy.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 399-400. Professor Sherman Cohn was even more positive, describing
inclusion of "all members of the former spurious class" as "the clear mandate of the [new]
rule 23." Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1219 (1966).
10. Referring to rule 23(b)(3), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit declared:
[Tihe rule now recognizes that the procedural tool of a class action must be workable if it is to be desirable. To hold that the former classifications of "true,"
"hybrid" and "spurious" must be perpetuated to allow or defeat aggregation would
seem to render the rule sterile in that regard.
Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1968).
11. 394 U.S. 332 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Snyder]. See 24 U. MLki amL. Rv.
173 (1969), for a critical analysis of the Court's reasoning in this case.
12. See note 25 infra, and accompanying text.
13. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), the Court held
that if the named members of the class are of diverse citizenship from the opposing party,
then a diversity action may be brought in federal court, even though some or all of the
unnamed members of the class are citizens of the opponent's state. Referring to this case,
the dissenters in Zahn commented that "it is difficult to understand why the practical
approach the Court took in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur must be abandoned where the
purely statutory 'matter in controversy' requirement is concerned." 94 S. Ct. at 516.
14. 94 S. Ct. at 509 (emphasis added). In effect, by basing its decision upon the separateness of the plaintiffs' claims, the court has retained the "spurious" classification allegedly
abolished by the 1966 revision of rule 23. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 1756 (1972) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT & A. MLER].
15. 94 S.Ct. at 511.
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In two concluding paragraphs the Court stated that it felt no inclination to "overrule" Snyder or to change its "long-standing construction
of the 'matter in controversy' requirement" for to do so "would undermine the purpose and intent of Congress in providing that plaintiffs in
diversity cases must present claims in excess of the jurisdictional
amount."' 1
The holding of the Court in Zahn is neither original nor surprising. 7
However, while the decision is consistent with the trend set in Snyder
and previous cases, it was certainly not dictated by those decisions. First,
the facts in Zahn are easily distinguishable from those in Snyder and
other cases cited."8 In Zahn, each and every one of the named plaintiffs
individually met the jurisdictional amount requirement, a situation nonexistent in prior cases. Second, rule 23 (b) (3), by providing "a series of
functional tests for determining the propriety of a class action" and by
omitting all reference to "joint or common interests,"' 9 does provide an
opportunity to move away from the "nice judicial distinctions"" ° of
"true," "hybrid" and "spurious" followed under the 1938 rule. Third,
the pivotal factor in the case is the Court's own previous interpretation
of "matter in controversy," which could be reinterpreted if the Court
so wished. Indeed there is ample precedent for such a reinterpretation,
particularly in the area of ancillary jurisdiction.
It is the Court's steady liberalization of jurisdictional requirements
with regard to ancillary jurisdiction which presents the best precedent
for a contrary holding in Zahn, and which also makes the existing holding so disappointing. In a number of cases where all original parties have
met federal jurisdictional requirements, other parties who have been
unable to meet the traditional diversity or jurisdictional amount requirement have nonetheless been held to be within the court's jurisdiction.
Such cases have involved compulsory counterclaims, 21 intervention, 2
impleader and interpleader.2 4 In these instances, the creation of ancillary
jurisdiction has been justified in terms of "fairness," "efficiency" or
16. Id. at 512. The crucial issue which the Zahn majority failed to discuss is the intent
of Congress in revising rule 23. It was suggested by the dissenters in both Snyder and Zahn
that this revision was made for the express purpose of broadening the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
17. In fact, Justices Fortas and Douglas in their dissent in Snyder suggested that Snyder
might eventually be applied to "all cases where one or more of the co-plaintiffs have a
claim of less than the jurisdictional amount ... ." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 32, 343 (1969).
18. In its six page opinion, the Court cited 46 cases, suggesting to this writer that the
Court recognized that its reasoning is lacking in persuasiveness.
19. C. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 307. See also the dissenting opinion in Snyder for an
analysis of the 1966 revisions.
20. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1968).
21. Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961).
22. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886). See also FED. R. CiV. P. 24(a).
23. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962). See
also FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
24. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
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"uniformity. ' 25 Yet when faced with a class action-a concept whose very
existence is based upon a need for efficiency and uniformity-the Court
refused to follow this liberalizing trend.
The fact that the Zahn Court was faced with a clear opportunity to
render a contrary verdict is significant. For in deliberately choosing to
restrict its jurisdiction, the Court has demonstrated a clear intent to keep
the small claimant out of federal court, regardless of the actual total
amount at issue. The Court in Zahn declined to acknowledge that it was
faced with a choice, or to discuss any public policy reason for the decision it made. However its real motivation undoubtedly was a desire to
avoid if at all possible the addition of any further "burdens" upon the
' 26
"already overloaded federal court system.
With the creation of rule 23(b)(3) in 1966, the class action was
seized upon as a particularly effective device for consumers and those
suffering environmental damage.27 Although such persons might have
very small individual claims, when combined such claims could amount
to millions of dollars-thus permitting effective litigation against large
and well-financed manufacturers, sellers or polluters. Under the Zahn
rule, 23(b)(3) class actions will only be permitted where: (1) each
named plaintiff alleges damages in excess of $10,000, (2) each unnamed
plaintiff has more than $10,000 damages, and (3) the unnamed plaintiffs
'
constitute a "definable" 28
class. The possibility that all of these requirements can be met is slim at best.
The theoretical result of the Zahn decision, as previously suggested
by the Court in Snyder,' is that those plaintiffs having more than $10,000
damages will maintain individual or joint actions in federal court, while
those having smaller claims will bring class or individual actions in state
court. In reality, the result will probably be that many plaintiffs, and
particularly those in consumer or environmental suits, will bring no
actions at all. 0
It is ironic that one source quoted by both the majority and the
three dissenters in Zahn was a statement by the 1958 Senate Judicial
Conference regarding the increase in the jurisdictional amount requirement from $3,000 to $10,000. That statement says, in part, that "[t]he
jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the federal courts
into courts of big business . . . ."" Unquestionably, in choosing to ex25. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036 (2d Cir. 1972). See also, C.
WRIGHT & A. MLR, supra note 14, at § 1917; Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdiction of

Third-Party Claims, 11 OKLA. L. REv. 326 (1958).
26. This was the reasoning employed in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).

27. See Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REv. 501 (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L. REv. 211 (1969).

28. See note 3 supra.
29. 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).

30. Another result, suggested by the Court in Zahn, is that the same jurisdictional
amount requirements will also be applied to class actions where jurisdiction is sought
under general federal questions. 94 S. Ct. at 508.

31. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958).
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clude the small claimant from diversity class actions the Court has taken
a significant step 82 toward precisely the conversion which it purported to
avoid.
THOMAS

A.

BODDEN

"MARY CARTER" LIMITATION ON LIABILITY AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN ADVERSARY PARTIES: A PAINTED
LADY IS EXPOSED
As the result of an accident involving a bus and two automobiles, the
plaintiffs' minor son was killed. A wrongful death action was brought
against Markam, the owner of the bus, Ward, the operator of the bus,
and Brinkman, the owner and driver of the other automobile. Ward and
Markam filed pre- and post-trial motions to produce' any "Mary Carter
Agreement" 2 which existed between their co-defendant Brinkman and the
plaintiffs. The motions were denied by the trial court on the theory that
such agreements are inadmissable into evidence. A judgment for $15,000
was subsequently entered in the plaintiffs' favor. The Florida District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed and held that, although the
trial court erred in denying the motions, the error did not result in prejudicial harm to the movants since they could have obtained a set-off for the
amount paid by Brinkman to the plaintiffs.8 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of Florida remanded the decision of the Fourth District and held:
The failure, upon the request of any adversely affected defendant, to
admit into evidence or to allow production of agreements which proportionately diminish the liability of one defendant by increasing the liability
of other defendants is prejudicial to the conduct of a fair trial. Ward v.
Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
The Mary Carter agreement derived its name from Booth v. Mary
CarterPaint Co.4 There certain defendants secretly entered into an agree32. Another large step in this same direction is the Court's recent decision in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974), under which the plaintiffs must bear the costs
of notifying all members of the class.
1. FrA. R. Civ. P. 1.350.
2. A Mary Carter agreement is an agreement
between the plaintiff and some (but less than all) defendants whereby the parties
place limitations on the financial responsibility of the agreeing defendants, the
amount of which is variable and usually in some inverse ratio to the amount of
recovery which the plaintitff is able to make against the nonagreeing defendant or
defendants.
Maule Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445, 446 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
3. Ward v. Ochoa, 271 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
4. 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) [hereinafter referred to as Booth]. For a recitation
of the facts, see Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), which
involved an appeal from an order granting a summary judgment.

